Abstract: We investigate the incentive and welfare implications of a merger when heterogeneous oligopolists compete both in process R&D and on the product market. We examine how a merger affects the output, investment, and profits of firms. In addition, we examine whether firms have merger incentives, and, if so, whether such mergers are desirable from the viewpoint of social welfare. If R&D is not expensive and if large cost differences between efficient and inefficient firms exist, a merger between homogeneous firms tends to occur even though it harms welfare.
Introduction
We investigate the incentive and welfare implications of a merger when heterogeneous oligopolists compete both in process R&D and on the product market. This is an important policy issue given that innovation has become increasingly important as a way for companies to achieve and maintain a competitive advantage. Following the recent trend of innovation activities, the recently issued guideline in the U.S., Horizontal Merger Guidelines 2010, explicitly mentions what types of mergers are more likely to diminish innovation activities and social welfare although the previous version of this guideline does not clearly mention the effect of horizontal mergers on the innovation incentives of firms. That is, it is a practice of antitrust policy to examine the innovation consequences of mergers.
Traditionally, when firms face decisions on mergers, they expect to acquire greater market shares and/or to achieve greater efficiencies (Röller, Stennek, and Verboven 2006) . These efficiency gains include operating synergies, diversification, financial synergies, and asset divestiture (Burgelman 1983; Jensen and Ruback 1983; Tremblay and Tremblay 1988; Larsson and Finkelstein 1999) . The prospect of economies of scale is also an important motive for a horizontal acquisition (Capron 1999; Harrison 2011) .
1 Economies of scale arise as a result of a horizontal merger if the merged firm achieves unit cost savings when it increases the scale of a given activity. They can also be achieved in functional areas including R&D, distribution, sales, and administrative activities through the spread of fixed costs. Among the elements related to economies of scale, technological innovation has often been mentioned as one of the main reasons for mergers and acquisitions (M&As) (de Man and Duysters 2005; Cassiman et al. 2005; Zhao 2009 ). One reason for this is that M&As may raise the overall R&D budgets of the companies involved (de Man and Duysters 2005) . This allows them to reap economies of scale and enables them to tackle larger R&D projects than each individual firm could have done independently. For instance, since the 1990s, Alcoa has sequentially taken over Alumax and Reynolds, which were US aluminum companies, whereas Alcan, Pechiney, and Alusuisse carried out a three-way merger in 2003. Those mergers might enable the companies to enlarge their capacities and/or innovation activities. On the other hand, M&As may be executed to lessen innovation expenditure if the innovative activities of merged firms overlap strongly with each other. For instance, when oil companies merge, they expect to yield savings in costs, including transportation and plant construction costs, because they can use their installed oil plants cooperatively and can eliminate the overlaps of their oil plants' functions (Matsushima 2001) .
Efficiency gains from a merger also can be achieved by merging with a firm with higher production efficiency. This can be a strong merger incentive when firms are heterogeneous in terms of their production efficiency. This implies that, for a low-productivity firm, merging with a high-productivity firm can be considered as an alternative to R&D. As a result, the efficiency levels of firms are determined endogenously, and the achieved levels depend crucially on combinations of merged firms. Therefore, it is worth analyzing M&As in the presence of both R&D activities related to firm efficiencies and heterogeneity of firms.
Based on the importance of analyzing M&As in the presence of both R&D activities and firm heterogeneity, several existing studies have examined the effects of R&D activities on M&As (Stenbacka 1991; Ziss 1994; Kabiraj and Mukherjee 2000; Mukherjee 2006; Sinha 2006; Davidson and Ferrett 2007; Jost and van der Velden 2008; Bartolini 2011; Ferrett and Poyago-Theotoky 2012) , and some previous research concerning M&As considered the heterogeneity of firms (Perry and Porter 1985; Farrell and Shapiro 1990; Barros 1998; Fumagalli and Vasconcelos 2009) . 2 None of these studies, however, uncover the interactions between the two important effects (R&D and heterogeneity) in the context of M&As. We aim to characterize the ways in which firm heterogeneity and the possibility of R&D affect the types of M&As that are likely to be observed and desirable from the viewpoint of welfare. We investigate horizontal mergers in a Cournot model with firm heterogeneity and R&D investment. We consider two scenarios. First, we assume an exogenous pairwise merger and explore in detail its possible impacts on the output, investment, and profits of firms. Second, using the concept of core as an equilibrium concept Persson 2000, 2001) , we fully examine which type of merger is likely to occur as an equilibrium outcome. We also examine whether such mergers are desirable from the viewpoint of social welfare. In the first scenario, although the presence of R&D is more likely to induce desirable mergers when firms are homogeneous, it may result in inefficient mergers from the welfare viewpoint when firms are heterogeneous, where the proportion of efficient firms plays a key role. More concretely, although firms have merger incentives in the presence of R&D, such mergers improve social welfare only when the share of efficient firms is sufficiently high. In the second scenario, under a sufficient degree of firm heterogeneity, a low R&D cost leads to a merger between homogeneous firms in equilibrium, whereas a high R&D cost impedes a merger between heterogeneous firms. Moreover, if R&D is not expensive, we observe a discrepancy between the incentives for and the desirability of mergers; that is, if R&D is not expensive and if large cost differences between efficient and inefficient firms exist, a merger between homogeneous firms tends to occur although it harms welfare. This tendency does not depend on whether the efficiency level of those homogeneous firms is high or low.
Our result provides a useful insight into competition policy. To inspect a horizontal merger in a market, policy makers need to know the production efficiency of merging firms, the degree of firm heterogeneity in the market, and whether R&D is not expensive. We can easily see the former two factors from the market shares of firms, although it seems difficult to know the last 2 Perry and Porter (1985) investigated the impact of a horizontal merger that causes a cost reduction through aggregating the capital of the merging firms. Fumagalli and Vasconcelos (2009) extended this to the discussion of international mergers. Those articles cannot investigate how a horizontal merger changes the strategic interaction of efforts on cost-reducing activities. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) comprehensively investigated the effect of the change in the output through a horizontal merger. One of our main concerns is how firms execute horizontal mergers under Cournot competition with R&D although the properties in Farrell and Shapiro (1990) are shared with those in our article.
Horizontal Mergers, Firm Heterogeneity, and R&D Investments factor. Still, the following interpretation may enable us to recognize the last factor: a lower R&D cost represents a higher discount factor of profits from the final product market after firms engage in cost-reducing activities; in other words, the R&D cost is small if an effort by a firm to reduce its marginal cost is immediately effective. Having information of these three factors, we can claim the following rule-of-thumb policy implication: policy makers should inspect plans for horizontal mergers between homogeneous firms in markets where technological progress is rapid and firm heterogeneity among firms is large.
We briefly review closely related articles. Davidson and Ferrett (2007) developed a Cournot model involving a cost-reducing R&D investment. 3 In their model, firms with the same ex ante marginal cost produce differentiated goods, and a merged firm produces two types of goods. Investment is good-specific, but investment has spillover effects. They showed that the investment increases the profitability of mergers and also explored how the degree of the spillover affects this profitability. Bartolini (2011) considered a coalition formation game in the context of Cournot competition. His article differs from ours in several aspects. First, the timing structure in his model is different from our model. In his model, after firms engage in R&D, they decide whether to form coalitions; 4 that is, premerger R&D in his model can be a strategic tool for firms, although our article focuses on how mergers influence the R&D incentives of firms. Therefore, we think that Bartolini (2011) and our article are complements. Second, he did not consider a case in which heterogeneous firms engage in R&D. Stenbacka (1991) considered the case in which the results of a costreducing investment are uncertain and the realization of the results is private information belonging to the innovating firm. He then examined whether merger anticipation leads to ex ante incentives for innovating firms to reveal their costreducing information. 5 Barros (1998) investigated a simple model highlighting the basic economic intuition about the relationship between initial market 3 Ziss (1994) discussed a merger under a duopoly case in which two firms engage in R&D with spillover. Kabiraj and Mukherjee (2000) considered the case in which two firms with the same ex ante marginal cost engage in R&D and then decide whether to merge given the outcome of R&D is determined. Mukherjee (2006) discussed the effect of cross-border mergers on R&D and welfare. Jost and van der Velden (2008) also discussed the effect of horizontal mergers when firms engage in R&D investments for a patent race with spillover. 4 Friberg, Norbäck, and Persson (2012) and Phillips and Zhdanov (2013) captured the bidding behavior of firms in an acquisition process after firms engage in R&D. These articles mainly focus on the strategic aspect of premerger R&D. We discuss the relationship between those articles and ours in Section 4. 5 Sinha (2006) also discussed the effect of horizontal mergers when the outcome of R&D can be private information. Atallah (2005) analyzed merger profitability in the case of cost-reducing R&D. In his numerical example, however, R&D investment does not provide incentives for mergers in most cases.
concentration and the size asymmetry of merger participants. He showed that in more concentrated markets, mergers involve less asymmetric firms, and merger participants rank high in terms of the size distribution of firms. However, he did not consider R&D activities. The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model and some preliminary results. Section 3 studies the effects of mergers on investment and output levels of firms and compares the cases of homogeneous and heterogeneous firms. Section 4 studies equilibrium under endogenous merger. Section 5 concludes the article.
Basic setup
Consider an industry consisting of N ( ≥ 3) firms initially. The number of firms changes when a merger occurs. The model has three stages: first, it is determined whether a particular type of merger occurs. In this and next sections, we treat this merger decision as exogenous, whereas we endogenize it in Section 4. Second, after the merger decisions, each (merged) firm chooses its investment level, which subsequently determines its marginal cost. In the third stage, each firm engages in Cournot competition, given the decisions on the merger and the realized marginal costs.
The investment decision in the second stage is specified as follows: each (merged) firm determines how much to invest in cost-reducing R&D activities. Let x i denote the investment level chosen by firm i. A unit increase in investment decreases the firm's marginal cost by the same margin. Thus, the total production cost incurred by the firm is given by (z i -x i )q i , where q i denotes the output level chosen by firm i.
6 In this specification, z i signifies the ex ante marginal cost (before the investment), whereas z i À x i denotes the ex post marginal cost (after the investment). The cost of the investment is assumed to be γx 2 i . γ represents an efficiency measure of the R&D investments.
We allow z i to differ across firms in the most simple way. Firms are either efficient and equipped with a low ex ante marginal cost z l or inefficient and equipped with a high ex ante marginal cost z h , where z l < z h .
7
6 This type of cost heterogeneity is also used in Barros and Nilssen (1999) and Ishida, Matsumura, and Matsushima (2011) . 7 We do not consider heterogeneity of R&D investment costs; that is, γ is common to all firms. Although incorporating this matter would be important, it complicates the analysis in this article. Moreover, we guess that this type of heterogeneity would have a similar effect on the incentive to merge as ex ante cost heterogeneity.
Horizontal Mergers, Firm Heterogeneity, and R&D Investments
We assume that if a pair of firms merge, the value of z i becomes the minimum value between them. 8 In this setting, a merger between heterogeneous firms is similar to the elimination of the less efficient merging firms. Therefore, the incentive for a merger can possibly come from two sources. One is the efficiency gain that arises in the case of a merger between heterogeneous firms; the other is the gain from investment that will be explained below. We implicitly assume that the production technology of each firm is perfectly substitutable in the sense that the technology of the less efficient firm is not useful for more efficient firms. In other words, when a pairwise merger between firms occurs, the R&D outcome from the R&D unit held by the less efficient firm at best merely duplicates that from the R&D unit held by the more efficient firm. Therefore, a merged firm uses only one R&D unit with more efficient ex ante production technology. This assumption would be applicable to cases in which the number of possible ways to improve the efficiencies of firms is small, because the production methods held by each firm would be more likely to overlap the other's. The assumption employed here is different from those in which merged firms can accumulate their capital for production (Perry and Porter 1985; Fumagalli and Vasconcelos 2009) . We hypothesize that a pairwise merger would be more profitable if we assume that a pair of merged firms accumulates their capital. Suppose that z l ¼ c and z h ¼ c þ δ, where c and δ are positive constants. δ represents the difference between the efficient and inefficient firms. We can apply the same calculation method to derive the equilibrium outcomes in the two cases. The ex ante marginal cost of a firm can be represented by c þ c i , where c i (i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; N) takes the value of either 0 or δ.
We first consider an equilibrium without mergers as the baseline to evaluate the effects of a merger. In the third stage, upon observing x i , the firms engage in standard Cournot (quantity) competition. The inverse demand function is specified as p ¼ 1 À Q, where Q is the total output. Each firm simultaneously chooses q i so as to maximize its own profit. The profit of firm i is given by
The Cournot competition leads to the following output levels:
In the second stage, firms decide on the investment level while considering eq.
[1]. The corresponding first-order condition is given as follows:
where the second line equality comes from the first-order condition of the Cournot game, @π i =@q i ¼ 0. Because we readily know that
As can be seen above, when a firm enlarges its effort to reduce its marginal cost, two effects exist: the direct gain and strategic gain. The direct gain stems from the quantity supplied by the firm. In other words, the significance of the cost saving is correlated to the quantity supplied. The strategic gain stems from decreases in the quantities supplied by the firm's rivals, which causes an increase in their market price. This is because the improvement of a firm's efficiency reduces the rivals' quantities supplied because of strategic substitutability. The two gains depend on the number of competitors. In general, the direct gain decreases with the number of competitors (see eq.
[1]). The strategic gain may increase with the number of competitors, because a unit decrease in a firm's marginal cost can affect more firms when the number of competitors is large. These two gains constitute the marginal revenue of investment, and the investment level is determined in such a way that the marginal revenue is equal to the marginal cost of investment. Using eq.
[2], we can derive the optimal investment level chosen by firm i in the second stage:
where c ; ðc 1 ; c 2 ; . . . ; c N Þ. Substituting eq.
[3] into eq.
[1], we obtain the equilibrium quantities supplied by firms:
This results in the profit of firm i as follows:
Number of efficient and inefficient firms
We consider the case in which n efficient and m inefficient firms exist (n ! 1 and m ! 1). The total number of firms is N ¼ n þ m. To explain this case, we replace ðN; c; c i Þ by ðn; m; c; c i Þ. Here, δ must satisfy the following inequality, because each firm's quantity supplied must be positive.
This determines the relevant interval of γ:
which we assume hereafter. Using eqs [3] and [4], we know that an efficient firm invests and produces more than an inefficient firm:
xðn; m; c; 0Þ À xðn; m; c; δÞ ¼ N½qðn; m; c; 0Þ À qðn; m; c; δÞ
Moreover, the profit functions of an efficient and an inefficient firms are given as follows:
πðn; m; c; 0Þ
πðn; m; c; δÞ
We easily find that πðn; m; c; 0Þ À πðn; m; c; δÞ > 0.
Merger effects
In this section, we analyze the effects of an exogenously assigned merger on each firm's levels of investment, output, profit, and social welfare. In our current framework, a pairwise merger takes one of the following three forms.
Type (I) A merger of efficient firms. Type (II) A merger of heterogeneous firms. Type (III) A merger of inefficient firms.
Because we assumed that the marginal cost of a merged firm is equal to the lesser marginal cost of the firms that compose the merger, a Type (I) merger is represented by a reduction in the number n of efficient firms, whereas a merger of Types (II) and (III) is described by a decline in the number m ¼ N À n of inefficient firms.
Effects on investment and output levels
We first see how mergers of different types of firms affect firms' investment decisions. The partial derivatives of xðn; m; c; c i Þ with respect to n and that with respect to m lead to the following lemma: 
That is, when the cost difference between the efficient and inefficient firms is large (δ is large), a merger including an inefficient firm decreases the investment levels of the efficient firms. We now mention the mechanism behind the inequalities in Lemma 1 (Ishida, Matsumura, and Matsushima 2011). As we saw in the previous section, investment accompanies two gains: the direct gain and strategic gain, where the former decreases with the number of competitors and the latter may increase with the number of competitors. The negative effect of the increase in competitors is small when those competitors are inefficient. Moreover, because the quantity supplied by each efficient firm is large, the strategic gain is greater for an efficient firm than for an inefficient firm, where such differential increases with the efficiency difference, δ. Therefore, if an additional competitor is less efficient, an increase in inefficient competitors enhances the R&D incentives of the efficient firms. In other words, if a merger eliminates an inefficient firm, the inefficient firm's exit through the merger diminishes the R&D incentives of the efficient firms.
We next check how different the impact of a merger on strategic variables is for different types of mergers. This can be achieved by comparing the derivatives of the strategic variable with respect to n and that with respect to m. We start by examining impacts on firms' investments using a comparison between @xðn; m; c; c i Þ=@n and @xðn; m; c; c i Þ=@m, the details of which are shown in Appendix A.
Lemma 2 A Type (I) merger has a greater impact on the investment level of each firm than a merger of Type (II) or (III).
An efficient firm occupies a larger market share than an inefficient firm, implying that a Type (I) merger, which reduces the number of efficient firms, weakens the competition among firms, and increases the incentive for investment more than the mergers of other types.
Lemma 2 is applied to the impact of a merger on the output of each firm:
Lemma 3 A Type (I) merger increases the output of each firm by more than that of a merger of Type (II) or (III).
This result arises from two effects: first, a Type (I) merger weakens competition among firms more than the other types of merger; second, it increases the cost-reducing investment by more than the other types of merger. As shown in Appendix A, a larger value of γ makes these tendencies weaker, implying that the lower cost of investment strengthens the impacts of a Type (I) merger relative to those of a merger of Type (II) or (III). Furthermore, we examine how a particular type of merger differently affects different firms as follows: @ xðn; m; c; 0Þ À xðn; m; c; δÞ ð Þ @l and @ qðn; m; c; 0Þ À qðn; m; c; δÞ ð Þ @l ;
where l ¼ m; n. Simple calculus leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 4 Any type of merger affects inefficient firms more than it affects efficient firms.
This result comes from the assumption of the quadratic cost function. As seen in eq. [7] , the level of investment is greater for an efficient firm than for an inefficient firm. When the cost function is quadratic, even a small change in the investment level leads to large changes in the investment cost for an efficient firm, which makes an efficient firm less sensitive to a particular change. Appendix A shows that such differences between the efficient and inefficient firms in terms of their reactions to a particular merger increase, as the investment becomes less expensive (as the value of γ decreases). Summarizing the above arguments, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (a) A merger between efficient firms (a Type (I) merger) has greater positive impacts on the levels of investment and output than a merger involving an inefficient firm (a merger of Type (II) or (III)). (b) A reduction in the number of firms of a particular type has greater positive impacts on the levels of investment and output of an inefficient firm than on an efficient firm. (c) These tendencies become more prominent as the cost of investment declines.
Profitability and desirability of a pairwise merger
We next examine how the existence of firm heterogeneity could interact with the investment decision to affect a merger incentive and the welfare consequence of such a merger. Here, to make the analysis as simple as possible, we consider a pairwise merger, that is, a merger between two firms only. A pairwise merger only reduces the number of firms from n to n À 1 or m to m À 1.
In this section, we use simple gains from a merger, that is, profitability, as a criterion of a merger incentive.
9 Therefore, when we consider a pairwise merger, we compare the profit of a merged firm with the joint profit of the firms involved in the merger. If the former is greater than the latter, we consider that this merger is profitable and that these two firms have an incentive to merge. More formally, a pairwise merger of each type is profitable if the following condition holds true.
• Regarding the welfare criterion, we use the social surplus W:
Denoting the premerger and postmerger surpluses as W and W M , respectively, a merger is desirable, if and only if W M À W > 0.
To uncover the effects of firm heterogeneity, we suppose temporarily that firms are homogeneous (z i ¼ z ¼ c, " i). We will compare the profitability and desirability of a merger in this case to those in the case of firm heterogeneity.
The case of homogeneous firms
When firms are homogeneous, the profitability of a merger depends on the (premerger) number of firms N and the efficiency measure of the R&D investments γ as shown in eq. [9] in Appendix B. Figure 1 describes the region where a pairwise merger is profitable in the γ À N plane. The shaded areas of Figure 1(a) represent the combinations of the efficiency measure of the R&D investments γ and the number of firms N under which a pairwise merger is profitable.
Note first that in our model, a merger changes (a) the degree of competition and (b) the level of investment. As shown by Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) , in a standard Cournot competition, only the effect on (a) is relevant; a merger is not profitable unless a merged firm occupies more than 80% of the market share. In contrast, once we introduce the cost-reducing investment, a pairwise merger is more likely to be profitable because of the effect on (b). In fact, Lemma 1 implies that a merger always induces firms to invest more when firms are homogeneous (i.e. δ ¼ 0). A larger investment leads to a lower marginal cost and raises the profit of each firm for a given market share. Because of this effect, a pairwise merger that is not profitable under standard Cournot competition may become Horizontal Mergers, Firm Heterogeneity, and R&D Investments profitable. For example, when γ ¼ 1, a pairwise merger is profitable for N 4, and the merged firm occupies one-third ( + 33%) at most of the market share.
Second, for a given γ, a pairwise merger is more likely to be profitable for a smaller N. This is because the lesser the number of firms, the more a pairwise merger increases the market share, which is likely to increase the additional profits of a merger. 10 Finally, when investment is less expensive, a pairwise merger can be profitable under a wide range of N. In fact, a pairwise merger becomes profitable for any number of firms, N ( ! 3), if the efficiency measure of the R&D investments γ becomes sufficiently small (the proof is given in Appendix B).
Summarizing the above arguments, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The cost-reducing R&D investment makes it more likely that a pairwise merger will be profitable than when there are no R&D investments. A pairwise merger is profitable for any number of firms if the investment cost is sufficiently small.
The shaded areas of Figure 1 (b) describe the combinations of γ and N under which a merger is desirable from the viewpoint of social welfare. When γ is sufficiently large, a pairwise merger is less likely to be desirable for a smaller N, as the merger effect on the degree of competition is greater. Moreover, a pairwise merger is desirable for any number of firms, N ( ! 3), if the efficiency measure of the R&D investments γ is sufficiently small (the proof is given in Appendix B):
Proposition 3 The cost-reducing R&D investment makes it more likely that a pairwise merger will be desirable from the welfare viewpoint than when there are no R&D investments. A pairwise merger is desirable for any number of firms, if the investment cost is sufficiently small.
Figure 1(c) shows the areas in which profitability and desirability do not go together. A pairwise merger is profitable but undesirable, when investment is expensive and the number of firms is small (γ > 1:5 and N is close to 3). In this case, the effect of reducing competition among firms is large enough for a 10 A change in the market share due to a pairwise merger is given by 1
which is greater for a smaller number of firms.
merger to be profitable, but the merger effect of enhancing investment is small, leading to decreases in the consumer surplus. The latter effect dominates the former, and the social surplus decreases. A pairwise merger is unprofitable but desirable when the number of firms is large and the cost of investment is not small (the upper-right area of Figure 1(c) ). With a large number of firms, the effect of a merger on the degree of competition is small, and it scarcely reduces the consumer surplus. Hence, because of increases in investment, the consumer surplus increases. In contrast, a small impact on the degree of competition leads to an unprofitable merger. The former effect dominates the latter, and a merger increases the social surplus.
The case of heterogeneous firms
Now, we move to the case where firms are heterogeneous in z i . Here, because it is very difficult to know whether a merger is profitable and desirable for arbitrary values of δ (firm difference) and γ (efficiency measure of the R&D investments) with n efficient and m inefficient firms, we need to specify either a pair of δ and γ or a pair of n and m in order to obtain precise results. The following proposition shows the profitability and desirability of a merger at the limits of δ and γ, which are comparable with the results shown in Propositions 2 and 3 (the proof is given in Appendix C).
Proposition 4 Suppose that firm differences are sufficiently large and that the investment cost is sufficiently small. That is, suppose that δ converges to δ in eq.
[5] and γ converges to γ in eq. [6] . A Type (I) or Type (II) merger is almost always profitable. A Type (III) merger is always profitable. A merger of any type is desirable, if the ratio of efficient firms is sufficiently high.
As shown in Appendix C, a merger of Type (I) or Type (II) is profitable when the ratio of efficient firms is higher than some threshold values (T pI and T pII ), which are given as follows. A Type (I) merger:
A Type (II) merger:
We can readily check that T pI and T pII decline as the number N of total firms increases. When N ¼ 3, T pI + 0:14 and T pII + 0:2. Hence, in this case, any type of merger is profitable, if at least one firm is efficient. These threshold values decline to T pI + 0:04 and T pII + 0:05 (T pI + 0:0085 and T pII + 0:012) when N ¼ 5 (N ¼ 10). Therefore, we can safely say that, even if the firms are heterogeneous, a pairwise merger is very likely to be profitable if the difference between the firms is large and the investment cost is small. We obtain very different results in terms of the desirability of a merger when comparing the case of heterogeneous firms with the case of homogeneous firms. From Appendix C, the threshold value for desirability for any merger (T d ) is given as follows:
We can see that T d is increasing with N. When N ¼ 3, T d + 0:63, implying that a merger is desirable if there is more than one efficient firm although it is undesirable if there is only one efficient firm. This is in contrast to the result of the homogeneous firm case, where a merger is always desirable when the investment cost is sufficiently low. T d increases to 0.70 and 0.82 when N becomes 5 and 10, respectively Lemma 1-(b) shows that if δ is greater than the threshold value, a decrease in the number of inefficient firms has a negative impact on the incentive of each efficient firm to engage in cost reduction. This is in contrast to the result in the case of homogeneous firms. As explained in Section 3.1, this negative impact on the efficient firms' incentives stems from the fact that a decrease in the number of inefficient firms diminishes the strategic gain from the cost-reducing investments. The market structure in the case of heterogeneous firms converges to that in the case of homogeneous firms as the number of efficient firms increases (n increases). This implies that a decrease in the number of firms through a merger has a positive impact on the social surplus (Proposition 3). This is because the market share is dispersed among the efficient firms when n is large. This implies that the economy of scale for each efficient firm's costreducing investment does not work well, because each efficient firm's output level, which is correlated to its investment level, is not large. The converse holds when the number of efficient firms is small; that is, the economy of scale for each efficient firm's cost-reducing investments works well, implying that a costreducing outcome by efficient firms is applied to most of the final products. This also means that the negative impact of a decrease in the number of firms through a merger is significant.
Summary of this section
These results show the important effects of firm heterogeneity and R&D investment on mergers' profitability and desirability. Our analysis shows that the large heterogeneity between firms and R&D investments raises the profitability of pairwise mergers. In addition, Proposition 4 shows that if R&D is not too expensive and large ex ante differences in marginal costs exist between firms, a merger between homogeneous firms tends to emerge in equilibrium, although there are cases in which a merger reduces the total surplus. The interaction of firm heterogeneity and R&D in the context of mergers is not studied in existing studies that investigate the effect of R&D on M&As (Stenbacka 1991; Ziss 1994; Kabiraj and Mukherjee 2000; Mukherjee 2006; Sinha 2006; Davidson and Ferrett 2007; Jost and van der Velden 2008; Bartolini 2011; Ferrett and Poyago-Theotoky 2012) or that investigate the effects of firm heterogeneity on M&As (Perry and Porter 1985; Farrell and Shapiro 1990; Barros 1998; Fumagalli and Vasconcelos 2009) .
Equilibrium under endogenous merger formation
Thus far, we have discussed the profitability (incentive) and desirability (efficiency) of a merger by assuming an exogenous pairwise merger. However, we must be careful in evaluating these results, because we are still not sure whether such a merger may emerge as an equilibrium outcome. In this section, we specify the number of firms as three and examine fully which type of merger is likely to occur as an equilibrium outcome under particular values of δ and γ. We follow Persson (2000, 2001) and use the core as an equilibrium concept. In doing so, we consider only a pairwise merger and assume that each merger consists of two firms. This assumption has been used frequently in previous studies and is appropriate in analyzing merger decisions, especially in the three-firm model, because monopoly is prohibited in most countries.
11 The ownership structure of the industry is assumed to be formed through a cooperative game of coalition formation. With three firms, it is interesting to consider the following two cases: (i) one efficient and two inefficient firms exist and (ii) two efficient and one inefficient firms exist. In these cases, we have four possible market structures.
Type (0 In case (i), there are one efficient firm (labeled A) and two inefficient firms (labeled E and F). Therefore, we have the following three possible market structures and four ownership structures.
Type ( In case (ii), there are two efficient firms (labeled A and B) and one inefficient firm (labeled E), and the following three possible market structures and four ownership structures are relevant. The solution procedure is based on Persson (2000, 2001) . They treat the merger process as a cooperative game of coalition formation, where the players are free to communicate and write binding contracts. When owners of firms agree on a merger, they can decide on any division of the firm's profits. However, payments between coalitions are not allowed. The approach then involves a comparison of any two possible ownership structures M i and M j . M i is said to "dominate" M j , if the combined profits of the "decisive" group of owners are greater in M i than in M j . The decisive group of owners comprises the owners who are expected to be able to influence whether M i will be formed instead of M j and vice versa. In our model, although owners belonging to identical coalitions in M i and M j cannot affect whether M j will be formed instead of M i , all remaining owners can influence this choice and thus they are decisive. 12 For instance, when we compare Type (0) (no merger, M In this case, E and F are the decisive owners, whereas A is not, implying that The ownership structure is in the core, if the structure is undominated by any other structures. We use the core as the equilibrium concept in the following analysis.
Note that several recent articles explicitly consider situations in which existing firms bid on purchasing a pre-determined target firm (Bertrand et al. 2012; Friberg, Norbäck, and Persson 2012; Phillips and Zhdanov 2013) . The model assumption in these articles can explicitly capture the bidding behavior of firms in an acquisition process, which is an advantage in their articles. The equilibrium concept employed in our article captures all patterns of mergers, although the assumption employed in the above three articles restricts possible pairs of merging firms. The comprehensive consideration of merging firms is an advantage in our article. Note that, in Friberg, Norbäck, and Persson (2012) and Phillips and Zhdanov (2013) , before the auction to the target firm, the existing firms including the target firm engage in cost-reducing R&D. Those articles mainly focus on the strategic aspect of premerger R&D. In our article, we do not consider such a strategic aspect of premerger R&D. Instead, we consider a situation in which each firm engages in cost-reducing activities after the market structure is determined through mergers. This implies that acquisition processes in our article are long-run decisions relative to cost-reducing activities. This also implies that existing firms cannot influence the market structure by engaging in cost-reducing activities.
One efficient and two inefficient firms exist
There are two types of pairwise mergers: Type (II), a merger between heterogeneous firms, and Type (III), a merger between inefficient firms. Figure 2 illustrates the combinations of the R&D efficiency parameter (γ) and the degree of firm difference (δ=ð1 À cÞ) that lead to equilibrium.
Note first that, because both types of mergers imply a decrease in the number of inefficient firms, neither of the ownership structures in the two types of mergers dominates the other. Hence, a particular ownership structure is in the core, if it is undominated by the ownership structure in the no-merger case. A Type (II) merger occurs in equilibrium for a broad area, whereas we observe a Type (III) merger when the investment cost is not large, which comes from Proposition 1-(c). When firms are less different and R&D investments are very expensive, the no-merger case is in the core because of the "merger paradox" (Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds 1983) . 13 When firms are very different and R&D investments are not expensive (see the upper left area in Figure 2 ), a merger between inefficient and efficient firms diminishes the merged firm's incentive to invest (Lemma 1-(b)); this merger will not be profitable. On the other hand, it is likely that two inefficient firms will merge, because the merger mitigates the efficient firm's incentive to invest (Lemma 1-(b)). How do those pairwise mergers change social welfare? The two types of pairwise mergers lead to the same duopoly market with one efficient and one inefficient firm. From the results in the previous sections, we have the conditions under which those pairwise mergers enhance/harm social welfare.
We now mention the mechanism behind the effects of mergers depicted in Figure 3 . When the cost difference is moderate, a merger is desirable because the 13 Incorporating convex cost functions into quantity competition models, McGinty (2007, 2008) reconsidered the problem of the "merger paradox."
elimination of an inefficient firm improves the production efficiency in the market (Lahiri and Ono 1988) . As shown in the previous section, when the cost difference is large enough and R&D investments are not expensive, a merger is not desirable as long as the share of efficient firms is lower than T d , which is around 0.63 in the three-firm case. Hence, if there is only one efficient firm, a merger is not desirable. Put differently, the existence of two inefficient firms induces the efficient firm to engage in more R&D (Lemma 1-(b)), which then accelerates the scale economies of R&D investments engaged in by the efficient firm and enhances social welfare compared with the case of one inefficient firm. Summarizing the above arguments, we have the following result.
Result 1 Suppose that there are one efficient and two inefficient firms. As depicted in Figure 2 , a Type (II) merger occurs in equilibrium for a broad area, whereas a Type (III) merger occurs in equilibrium only when the investment cost is not large. As depicted in Figure 3 , a merger is harmful from the viewpoint of social welfare, if the cost difference between the efficient and inefficient firms is large enough or if the difference is small enough under the case in which the investment cost is not small enough. Horizontal Mergers, Firm Heterogeneity, and R&D Investments
Two efficient firms and one inefficient firm exist
There are two types of pairwise mergers: Type (I), a merger between efficient firms, and Type (II), a merger between heterogeneous firms. Figures 4 and 5 describe the equilibrium and its welfare properties, respectively. In this case, a Type (II) merger again occurs in equilibrium over a broad area of the figure. In contrast, a Type (I) merger occurs, only when the degree of firm difference is sufficiently large and the investment cost is sufficiently small. A Type (I) merger leads to a duopoly of efficient and inefficient firms, whereas a Type (II) merger results in a duopoly of two efficient firms. Proposition 1-(a) implies that the former has greater impacts on the price than the latter. This effect is amplified as γ decreases (Proposition 1-(c) ). Moreover, a large firm difference indicates that the merged firm in a Type (I) merger is more likely to have a higher market share, implying that this type of merger is more likely to be profitable. Meanwhile, from Proposition 1-(b), an outside firm (an inefficient firm) in a Type (I) merger gains more than the merged firm, and this ownership structure is in equilibrium. We now mention the mechanism behind the effects of mergers depicted in Figure 5 . The mechanism behind a Type (II) merger is similar to the previous case in which only one efficient firm exists. When the cost difference is small and R&D investments are not expensive, a Type (I) merger is desirable even though it does not take place. The desirability of the merger stems from the scale economies of R&D investments, but it does not take place because of the "merger paradox" (Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds 1983; Davidson and Ferrett 2007) . When the cost difference is large and R&D investments are not expensive, a Type (I) merger is not desirable even though it occurs. The undesirability of the merger stems from the excessive increase in the degree of market concentration, but the merger occurs for the reasons discussed in the previous paragraph. Because the inefficient firm is highly inefficient, a Type (I) merger gives strong market power to the merged firm.
Summarizing the above arguments, we have the following result.
Result 2 Suppose that there are two efficient and one inefficient firms. As depicted in Figure 4 , a Type (II) merger occurs in equilibrium for a broad area, whereas a Type (I) merger occurs in equilibrium only when the investment cost is small enough and the degree of firm difference is sufficiently large. As depicted in Figure 5 , when a Type (I) merger occurs, it is always harmful from the viewpoint of social welfare. When a Type (II) merger occurs, it is harmful from the viewpoint Horizontal Mergers, Firm Heterogeneity, and R&D Investments of social welfare only when the cost difference between the efficient and inefficient firms is small enough under the case in which the investment cost is not small enough.
Discussions on firm heterogeneity
In this subsection, we briefly discuss the case in which three firms are all different; firms A and C are efficient and inefficient, respectively, and their ex ante marginal costs are c and c þ δ, respectively. Firm B is the second most efficient firm; its ex ante marginal cost is c þ αδ, where 0 α 1. We can show an example that a merger is desirable from the welfare viewpoint if and only if γ is small enough, and δ=ð1 À cÞ is smaller than a threshold value δðαÞ; that is, R&D investments are not expensive and δ=ð1 À cÞ < δðαÞ. This implies that given the efficiencies of the most and the least efficient firms, the existence of the second most efficient firm with an intermediate value of α does not enhance social welfare. This is because it crowds out the incentive of the most efficient firm to invest. If it is less efficient (the value of α is higher), it enhances the incentive of the most efficient firm to invest. Therefore, if R&D investments are not expensive (γ is small), inefficient firms can be more beneficial than ones with intermediate efficiency levels.
Concluding remarks
We investigated the incentive and welfare implications of a merger when heterogeneous oligopolists compete both in process R&D and on the product market. We showed that although firms have merger incentives in the presence of R&D, such mergers improve social welfare only when the share of efficient firms is sufficiently high. Under a sufficient degree of firm heterogeneity, a low R&D cost leads to a merger between homogeneous firms in equilibrium, whereas a high R&D cost impedes a merger between heterogeneous firms. Moreover, if R&D is not expensive, we observe a discrepancy between the incentives for and the desirability of mergers; that is, if R&D is not expensive and if large cost differences between efficient and inefficient firms exist, a merger between homogeneous firms tends to occur even though it harms welfare. This tendency does not depend on whether the efficiency level of those homogeneous firms is high or low.
Our result provides a useful insight into competition policy. To inspect a horizontal merger, we need to understand market environments in which R&D is not expensive, in other words, γ is small. We have at least two interpretations of what the value of γ means. First, the value is literally interpreted; that is, it represents the cost of R&D. Second, the value of γ represents the discount rate of profits from the final product market after firms engage in cost-reducing activities. The value of γ is small, if an effort by a firm to reduce its marginal cost is immediately effective. Following the second interpretation, we have a policy implication: policy makers should inspect the plans of horizontal mergers between homogeneous firms in markets where technological progress is rapid and firm heterogeneity among firms is large.
Several comments are in order. First, one may think that cost-reducing R&D has spillover effects that reduce other firms' costs as well. We have confirmed that as the spillover effects of a firm's cost-reducing R&D become significant, mergers are less likely to happen because those mergers eliminate an opportunity for firms to exploit the spillover effects.
14 Second, we have assumed that when two firms merge, the least efficient one closes down. While this assumption is common in literature of industrial organization, it is in reality problematic. If we assume that the marginal cost of each firm is increasing with its quantity supplied, all production units continue to operate even when a merger occurs. While employing the assumption is preferable, this complicates the analysis in this article. We hope to follow up this important issue in future research.
Finally, this article focuses on economies of scale as a source of merger motivation. Economies of scope is also an important factor when firms decide to merge. Most large firms that merge are multiproduct firms, and much of the gain from the merger often comes from combining expertise about different products, rather than from increases in the output of a particular product. We also hope to investigate this important issue in future research.
Although we do not consider governmental policy including R&D subsidies to firms, Huck and Konrad (2004) pointed out the importance of the relationship between the merger activities and governmental policy in the context of strategic trade policy.
15 This is also an interesting topic for future research. These differences are smaller for a larger value of γ, because
Appendix B: profitability and desirability of a pairwise merger in the case of homogeneous firms Let π M denote the profit of a merged firm. We can show that the difference between π M and the joint profit of firms involved in the merger is given as follows: Therefore, π M À 2π i is positive, if and only if
For a given number of firms, N (! 3), the firms supply goods as long as γ > N 2 = N þ 1 ð Þ 2 . Therefore, the lower bound of the relevant interval of γ is N 2 = N þ 1 ð Þ 2 . Evaluating Δ at this lower bound, we have
The upper bound of the relevant interval of δ is δ, given in eq. [5] , and the lower bound of the relevant interval of γ is γ, given in eq. [6] . Evaluating gains from a merger at these bounds, we obtain 
